信息不完全下的组合仲裁

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Combined Arbitraiton with Incomplete Information

1.
Institute of Systems Engineering,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai;Institute of System Engineering,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan

摘要: 基于争议双方对仲裁人的裁决值有不同概率估计这一前提分析组合仲裁.构造了它的非合作对策模型.然后利用此模型,在多种情形下探讨了Nash均衡报价策略的存在性,得出了组合仲裁不能诱导争议双方报价收敛的结论,这与Brams和Merrll Ⅱ在争议双方对裁决值有相同概率估计前提下获得的著名结论正好相反.最后分析了当一方变得风险厌恶时, 对争议双方报价的影响.
- 仲裁 /
- 协商 /
- 不完全信息 /
- 非合作对策 /
- Nash均衡
Abstract: Based on the assumption that both disputants have different probability estimations to arbitrator's decision, combined arbitration is analyzed and a non-cooperative game with incomplete information is constructed. Existence of Nash equilibrium offer strategy is discussed for several cases, and the conclusion that combined arbitration can't give the disputants an incentive to converge is achieved. Finally, we analyze the effect on both disputants offers when one of them becomes risk aversion.
- Nash equilibrium /
- arbitration /
- bargaining /
- incomplete information /
- non-cooperative games