智能电网虚假数据注入攻击弹性防御策略的拓扑优化

罗小元; 何俊楠; 王新宇; 李宏波; 关新平

doi:10.16383/j.aas.c230020

智能电网虚假数据注入攻击弹性防御策略的拓扑优化

doi: 10.16383/j.aas.c230020

罗小元^1,,
何俊楠^1,,
王新宇^{1, 2,},
李宏波^1,,
关新平^3,

1.
燕山大学电气工程学院秦皇岛 066004
2.
江苏省配电网智能技术与装备协同创新中心南京 636600
3.
上海交通大学电子信息与电气工程学院上海 200240

基金项目: 国家自然科学基金(61873228, 62103357), 河北省教育厅青年基金 (QN2021139), 河北省自然科学基金 (F2021203043), 江苏省配电网智能技术与装备协同创新中心开放基金项目(XTCX202203)资助

详细信息

作者简介:
罗小元：燕山大学自动化系教授. 2005年获得燕山大学控制科学与工程学科博士学位. 主要研究方向为CPS网络攻击检测, 网络控制系统. E-mail: xyluo@ysu.edu.cn

何俊楠：燕山大学控制科学与工程专业硕士研究生. 主要研究方向为智能电网攻击防御. E-mail: 17854221989@163.com

王新宇：燕山大学电气工程学院讲师. 2020年获得燕山大学控制科学与工程学科博士学位. 主要研究方向为智能电网攻击检测与防御. 本文通信作者. E-mail: wxyzmya@ysu.edu.cn

李宏波：燕山大学控制科学与工程专业硕士研究生. 主要研究方向为智能电网攻击防御. E-mail: lhb@stumail.ysu.edu.cn

关新平：上海交通大学电子信息与电气工程学院教授. 1999年获得哈尔滨工业大学控制科学与工程学科博士学位. 主要研究方向为无线网络系统, CPS网络攻击检测. E-mail: xpguan@sjtu.edu.cn

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出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2023-01-13
- 录用日期: 2023-04-04
- 网络出版日期: 2023-04-26
- 刊出日期: 2023-06-20

Research on Topology Optimization of Resilient Defense Strategy Against False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid

1.
School of Electrical Engineering, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004
2.
Jiangsu Collaborative Innovation Center for Smart Distribution Network, Nanjing 636600
3.
School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240

Funds: Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (61873228, 62103357), Science and Technology Youth Foundation of Hebei Education Department (QN2021139), Natural Science Foundation of Hebei Province (F2021203043), and the Open Research Fund of Jiangsu Collaborative Innovation Center for Smart Distribution Network, Nanjing Institute of Technology (XTCX202203)

More Information

Author Bio:
LUO Xiao-Yuan　Professor at the School of Electrical Engineering, Yanshan University. He received his Ph.D. degree in control science and engineering from Yanshan University in 2005. His research interest covers detection of cyber attack of CPS and networked control systems

HE Jun-Nan　Master student of control science and engineering, Yanshan University. Her main research interest is smart grid attack defense

WANG Xin-Yu　Lecturer at the School of Electrical Engineering, Yanshan University. He received his Ph.D. degree in control science and engineering from Yanshan University in 2020. His research interest covers attack detection and defense in smart grid. Corresponding author of this paper

LI Hong-Bo　Master student of control science and engineering, Yanshan University. His main research interest is smart grid attack defense

GUAN Xin-Ping　Professor at the School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He received his Ph.D. degree in control science and engineering from Harbin Institute of Technology in 1999. His research interest covers wireless networked systems and detection of cyber attack in CPS

摘要

摘要: 基于虚拟隐含网络的虚假数据注入攻击(False data injection attack, FDIA)防御控制策略, 本文提出了一种基于图论的拓扑优化算法来提高其防御性能. 首先, 提出了一种图的等效变换方法 — 权值分配法, 实现二分图连接拓扑与二分图拉普拉斯矩阵的一一对应; 进而基于网络拓扑的连通度以及连通图的可去边理论, 给出了虚拟隐含网络和二分图连接网络的拓扑选择依据; 在考虑拓扑权值的基础上, 给出了权值拓扑优化的指标评价函数; 通过求解指标评价函数的最小化代价实现拓扑优化选择, 从而改善基于虚拟隐含网络的虚假数据注入攻击防御方法的性能. 最后, 通过在IEEE-14总线电网系统上的仿真验证了所提算法的有效性.
- 智能电网 /
- 虚假数据注入攻击 /
- 攻击防御 /
- 拓扑图论
Abstract: Based on the defense control strategy of virtual hidden network, this paper proposes a topology optimization algorithm based on graph theory to improve the defense performance of power system against false data injection attacks. Firstly, an equivalent transformation method of graph-weight distribution method is proposed to realize the one-to-one correspondence between the connection topology of bipartite graph and the Laplace matrix of bipartite graph; Then, based on the connectivity of network topology and the theory of removable edges of connected graphs, the topological selection basis of virtual hidden networks and bipartite graph connected networks is given; Based on the consideration of topological weights, the index evaluation function of topological optimization of weights is given; By minimizing the cost of index evaluation function, topology optimization is realized, and then the performance of false data injection attack defense method based on virtual hidden network is improved. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is verified by simulation on IEEE-14 bus power grid system.
- Smart grid /
- false data injection attack (FDIA) /
- attack defense /
- topological graph theory

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图 1 智能电网攻击示意图

Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of smart grid attack

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图 2 互联网络结构: ${{{\Sigma}}_{{1}}}$为电力系统拓扑, ${{{\Sigma}}_{{2}}}$为虚拟隐含网络拓扑, ${{{\Sigma}}_{\rm{eng}}}$为二分图连接拓扑

Fig. 2 Connection network structure: ${{{\Sigma}}_{{1}}}$ is the power system topology, ${{{\Sigma}}_{{2}}}$ is the virtual network topology, and ${{{\Sigma}}_{\rm{eng}}}$ is the connection topology of bipartite graph

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图 3 权值分配法原理示意

Fig. 3 Schematic diagram of weight allocation method

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图 4 非连通图下的权值分配法无法消去横路径情形

Fig. 4 The weight allocation method under disconnected graph cannot eliminate the transverse path case

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图 5 非连通图下存在连通分支时的权值分配法

Fig. 5 Weight allocation method for connected branches in disconnected graphs

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图 6 非连通图下多条横路径消去的权值分配法

Fig. 6 Weight allocation method for elimination of multiple transverse paths in disconnected graphs

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图 7 权值分配法流程图

Fig. 7 Flow chart of weight allocation method

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图 8 等效变换原理仿真分析

Fig. 8 Simulation analysis of equivalent transformation principle

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图 9 随机拓扑图及权值分配法化简后的拓扑图

Fig. 9 Random topology and topology simplified by weight allocation method

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图 10 随机拓扑图及权值分配法化简后的拓扑图

Fig. 10 Random topology and topology simplified by weight allocation method

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图 11 IEEE-14节点系统转子角仿真图

Fig. 11 Rotor angle simulation diagram of IEEE-14 system

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图 12 IEEE-14节点系统角频率仿真图

Fig. 12 Rotor angular frequency simulation diagram of IEEE-14 system

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表 1 优化前后拓扑的指标函数值

Table 1 Index function values of the topology before and after optimization

$ \Sigma_{2}$和$\Sigma_{{\rm{eng}}}$	优化前	优化后
图9(a)、图9(b)	0.0187	53.7803
图9(c)、图9(d)	0.0257	38.7909
图9(e)、图9(f)	0.0198	50.6919
图10(a)、图10(b)	0.0377	26.6923
图10(c)、图10(d)	0.0401	24.7731
图10(e)、图10(f)	0.0607	16.7136

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