信息物理融合系统综合安全威胁与防御研究

刘烃; 田决; 王稼舟; 吴宏宇; 孙利民; 周亚东; 沈超; 管晓宏

doi:10.16383/j.aas.2018.c180461

信息物理融合系统综合安全威胁与防御研究

doi: 10.16383/j.aas.2018.c180461

刘烃^1, ,,
田决^1,,
王稼舟^1,,
吴宏宇^2,,
孙利民^3,,
周亚东^1,,
沈超^1,,
管晓宏^1,4,

1.
西安交通大学智能网络与网络安全教育部重点实验室西安 710049 中国
2.
堪萨斯州立大学电气和计算机工程系曼哈顿堪萨斯州 66506 美国
3.
中国科学院信息工程研究所北京 100093 中国
4.
清华大学智能与网络化系统研究中心北京 100084 中国

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金 61772408

国家自然科学基金 61472318

中央高校基本科研专项资金，霍英东教育基金会 151067

国家自然科学基金 U1766215

国家重点研发计划 2016YFB0800202

国家自然科学基金 61632015

国家自然科学基金 U1736205

详细信息

作者简介:
田决  中国香港理工大学电机工程学院研究助理.2018年于西安交通大学获得网络空间安全专业博士学位.主要研究方向为信息物理融合系统安全.E-mail:juetian@sei.xjtu.edu.cn

王稼舟  西安交通大学电子与信息工程学院硕士研究生.2017年于华北电力大学获得学士学位.主要研究方向为智能电网安全.E-mail:wjz_98@163.com

吴宏宇  美国堪萨斯州立大学电气与计算机工程学院助理教授.2011年于西安交通大学获得控制科学与工程专业博士学位.主要研究方向为智能电网的安全与防御.E-mail:hongyuwu@ksu.edu

孙利民  中国科学院信息工程研究所研究员, 中国科学院大学教授.1998年于国防科学技术大学计算机学院获得博士学位.主要研究方向为工控系统安全以及物联网安全.E-mail:sunlimin@iie.ac.cn

周亚东  西安交通大学电子与信息工程学院副教授.2011年于西安交通大学获得控制科学与工程专业博士学位.主要研究方向为数据驱动的网络行为与内容安全, 网络科学理论及其应用.E-mail:ydzhou@xjtu.edu.cn

沈超  西安交通大学电子与信息工程学院、网络空间安全学院副教授.主要研究方向为数据驱动的网络行为与内容安全, 人工智能安全, 工控系统与网络安全.E-mail:chaoshen@xjtu.edu.cn

管晓宏  中国科学院院士, 西安交通大学和清华大学教授.1993年获得美国康涅狄格大学博士学位.主要从事能源电力系统优化与安全理论与应用研究.E-mail:xhguan@mail.xjtu.edu.cn

通讯作者:
刘烃西安交通大学网络空间安全学院副教授.2010年于西安交通大学获得系统工程专业博士学位.主要研究方向包括软件安全和智能电网安全.本文通信作者.E-mail:tingliu@mail.xjtu.edu.cn

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出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2018-07-10
- 录用日期: 2018-09-03
- 刊出日期: 2019-01-20

Integrated Security Threats and Defense of Cyber-physical Systems

LIU Ting^{1
, ,},
TIAN Jue^1
,,
WANG Jia-Zhou^1
,,
WU Hong-Yu^2
,,
SUN Li-Min^3
,,
ZHOU Ya-Dong^1
,,
SHEN Chao^1
,,
GUAN Xiao-Hong^{1,4
,}

1.
Key Laboratory of Intelligent Network and Network Security, Xi'an Jiao Tong University, Xi'an 710049, China
2.
ECE Department, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas State 66506, USA
3.
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China
4.
Center for Intelligent and Networked Systems, Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Funds:

National Natural Science Foundation of China 61772408

National Natural Science Foundation of China 61472318

Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and Fok Ying-Tong Education Foundation, China 151067

National Natural Science Foundation of China U1766215

National Key Research and Development Program of China 2016YFB0800202

National Natural Science Foundation of China 61632015

National Natural Science Foundation of China U1736205

More Information

Author Bio:
Research assistant in the Department of Electrical Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, China. He received his Ph. D. degree in cyberspace security from Xi0an Jiaotong University in 2018. His research interest covers cyber-physical systems security

Master student at the School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Xi0an Jiaotong University. He received his bachelor degree from North China Electric Power University in 2017. His main research interest is smart grids security

Assistant professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Kansas State University, USA. He received his Ph. D. in control science and engineering from Xi0an Jiaotong University, China in 2011. His main research interest is cyber security in smart grids

Research fellow at the Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Professor at the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences. He received his Ph. D. degree from the School of Computer Science, National University of Defense Technology in 1998. His research interest covers the safety of industrial control systems and IoT security

Associate professor at Xi0an Jiaotong University. He received his Ph. D. degree in control science and engineering from Xi0an Jiaotong University in 2011. His research interest covers data driven network security, network science and its applications

Associate professor at the School of Electronic and Information Engineering and the School of Cyber Security, Xi0an Jiaotong University. His research interest covers data driven network behavior and content security, security in artificial intelligent, and industrial system and network security

Member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, professor at Xi0an Jiaotong University and Tsinghua University. He received his Ph. D. degree from the University of Connecticut in 1993. His research interest covers energy and power system optimization and security theory and application research

Corresponding author: LIU Ting Associate professor at the School of Cyber Security, Xi0an Jiaotong University. He received his Ph. D. degree in systems engineering from Xi0an Jiaotong University in 2010. His research interest covers software security and smart grids security. Corresponding author of this paper

摘要

摘要: 信息物理融合系统（Cyber-physical system，CPS）是计算单元与物理对象在网络空间中高度集成交互形成的智能系统.信息系统与物理系统的融合在提升系统性能的同时，信息系统的信息安全威胁（Security）与物理系统的工程安全问题（Safety）相互影响，产生了新的综合安全问题，引入严重的安全隐患.本文介绍了CPS的概念与安全现状，给出了CPS综合安全的定义；在对现有安全事件进行分析的基础上，提出了CPS的综合安全威胁模型；从时间关联性和空间关联性的角度，对现有CPS攻击和防御方法进行了分类和总结，并探讨CPS综合安全的研究方向.
- 信息物理融合系统 /
- 综合安全 /
- 威胁模型 /
- 综合防御
Abstract: Cyber-physical system (CPS) is an intelligent system consisting of computing units and physical objects that highly interact with each other through the network. The combination of cyber system and physical system is promoting the performance of the CPS. At the same time, it also introduces a new integrated security threat into CPS, which combines engineering safety threat of physical system and information security threat of cyber system. In this paper, concepts and security status of CPS are introduced, and the concept of CPS integrated security is defined. After analyzing several existing security accidents in CPS, a new threat model of CPS integrated security is proposed. Existing CPS attacks and defense methods are classified and summarized from a perspective of temporal and spatial correlation. The future research of CPS integrated security is discussed.
- Cyber-physical system (CPS) /
- integrated security /
- threat model /
- integrated defense
注释:

1) 本文责任编委吕宜生

HTML全文

图 1 CPS概念模型^[1]

Fig. 1 CPS conceptual model^[1]

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图 2 CPS控制模型

Fig. 2 CPS control model

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图 3 CPS综合安全威胁模型

Fig. 3 Integrated security model of CPS

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图 4 CPS攻击分类

Fig. 4 Taxonomy of CPS attack

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图 5 攻击区域与非攻击区域

Fig. 5 Attack area and non-attack area

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图 6 信息受限下的拓扑攻击

Fig. 6 Topology attacks with limited information

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图 7 CPS防御分类

Fig. 7 Taxonomy of CPS defense

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表 1 时间隐蔽型攻击对比

Table 1 Time concealment attack contrast

攻击类别	攻击者先验知识	读写权限	隐蔽性
零动态攻击	矩阵$A$、$B$与$C$	大部分控制指令读权限与写权限	隐蔽
局部零动态攻击	$A_{11}$、$A_{21}$、$B_1$以及$C_1$	大部分控制指令读权限与写权限	隐蔽
零状态诱导攻击	矩阵$A$、$B$与$C$	大部分控制指令读权限与写权限	隐蔽

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表 2 空间—时间隐蔽型攻击对比

Table 2 Space—time stealth attack contrast

攻击类别	攻击者先验知识	读写权限	隐蔽性
Stuxnet重放攻击	不需要	部分控制指令写权限, 全部量测信号的读写权限	隐蔽
量测量无关攻击	矩阵$A$、$B$与$C$	部分或全部控制指令读写权限, 全部量测信号的读写权限	隐蔽
系统模拟攻击	矩阵$A$、$B$、$C$、$Q$与$R$系统初始状态$\pmb{x}[0]$	部分或没有控制指令的读写权限, 全部量测值的读写权限	隐蔽

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