Development of Several Studies on Indirect Reciprocity and the Evolution of Cooperation
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摘要: 2005年Science杂志指出"合作行为如何进化"是21世纪最关键的25个科学问题之一.间接互惠如何促进合作演化的研究已吸引了包括经济学家、社会学家和演化生物学家等众多学者的关注.这是由于：人类社会道德的形成、社会化分工、语言的出现、人类大脑的进化等都和间接互惠密不可分；随着经济全球化和网络时代的到来，依赖声望和信誉的陌生个体间的交易日益频繁，局部信息条件下个体的信任被利用的"道德风险"逐渐增大.本文所关注的间接互惠是以声望为核心的"下游互惠"，具体而言，个体通过帮助他人建立自己在群体中的好声望，从而期待未来获得他人的帮助.可见，声望是"下游互惠"发挥作用的关键.声望的建立引发了两方面的研究：1）如何评价个体声望的好与坏，焦点是何种声望评估准则能够促进合作的演化；2）个体的声望如何在群体中快速、准确、广泛地传播，使得陌生个体间能够获得彼此的声望信息，其中八卦这种声望传播方式成为间接互惠的研究热点之一.基于声望的间接互惠研究前景广阔，未来可能的研究方向主要有复杂网络上的间接互惠、声望传播系统的鲁棒性、声望共享系统的建立和间接互惠在P2P网络中的应用.Abstract: How does cooperation evolve' has been considered as one of the most important scientific problems in the 21st century since 2005. The study about indirect reciprocity has attracted increasing attention from researchers such as economists, sociologists, and evolutionary biologists. There are mainly two reasons for this:Indirect reciprocity is closely related to the formation of human morality, socialized labor division, emergence of language, human brain evolution, and many other social developments; the deal among strangers, which mainly depends on reputation and credit, becomes more and more frequent with the economic globalization and the Internet era coming, thus the 'moral risk' of individual trust being exploited is increasing under local information conditions. In this paper, we focus on 'downstream reciprocity' which belongs to a form of indirect reciprocity and is based on reputation, specifically, individuals can obtain good reputation by helping others and then look forward to getting others' help in future. Obviously, reputation is the key factor for 'downstream reciprocity' to work. The establishment of reputation has motivated two studies:How do we define good reputation and bad reputation? Such studies aim to answer which reputation evaluation criterion can promote the evolution of cooperation; how does individual reputation information spread among strangers quickly, accurately, and widely so that individuals can know each other's reputation? Here, gossip, as one way of reputation dispersal, becomes one hot research topic. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is a promising study, and the possible future research topics are indirect reciprocity in complex networks, robustness of reputation dispersal system, establishment of reputation sharing system, and application of indirect reciprocity in the P2P network.
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Key words:
- Evolutionary game theory /
- indirect reciprocity /
- reputation evaluation criterion /
- gossip /
- P2P network
1) 本文责任编委 张化光 -
表 1 声望评估准则
Table 1 Reputation evaluation criterion
声望评估准则 定义 数量(种) 典型的例子 "一阶评估" 考虑捐助者行为 $2^2=4$ "形象分数" "二阶评估" 同时考虑捐助者行为和接受者声望 ${(2^2)}^2=16$ "温和准则"、"严苛准则" "三阶评估" 同时考虑捐助者行为和声望及接受者声望 ${({(2^2)}^2)}^2=256$ 
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表 2 典型的"二阶评估"
Table 2 Representative "second-order evaluation"
捐助者行为/接受者声望 捐助/好 捐助/坏 不捐助/好 不捐助/坏 "温和准则" 好 坏 坏 好 "严苛准则" 好 坏 坏 坏
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表 3 8种促进合作演化的声望评估准则
Table 3 Eight reputation evaluation criterions which favor the evolution of cooperation
捐助者声望/接受者声望 好/好 好/坏 坏/好 坏/坏 捐助者捐助 好 未知 好 未知 捐助者不捐助 坏 好 坏 未知
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