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摘要: 联盟形成是多 agent 系统中的一个关键问题, 主要着眼于如何在联盟内 agent 间划分联盟的效用. 但已有策略无法摆脱搭便车问题, 尤其是额外效用的分配没有确切反映出各 agent 对于联盟贡献的差异性, 导致联盟潜在的不稳定. 本文给出了一种新的联盟形成的行为策略, 在公平分配原则和无妒忌原则的基础上, 提高了对额外效用分配的合理性, 在具有超加性的面向任务的领域中可以形成全局最优联盟, 并具有 Nash 均衡意义下的稳定性.Abstract: Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. It mainly deals with the coalition's utility distribution among agents according to their preferences. Existing strategies have an inextricable free-rider problem, which can not clearly distinguish each agent's contribution and may result in coalition's potential instability. In order to tackle the shortage above, a novel coalition formation strategy based on rational agents is presented, which is restricted by the principle of impartial distribution and non-jealous standard, and improves the justice of allocation for additional utility. In superadditive task oriented domains, the proposed strategy can reach a global-optimal coalition, which is stable with Nash equilibrium.
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Key words:
- Coalition formation /
- rational agents /
- free-rider problem /
- Nash equilibrium
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